Proulx Research

CAN BEHAVIOURAL CONSTRAINTS ALTER THE STABILITY OF SIGNALLING EQUILIBRIA? Proulx, S.R., 2001. Proceedings:Biological Sciences, 268:2307-2313.

Abstract
In traditional models of signalling one class of individual, the signaller, presents a signal which another class of individual, the receiver, examines. Receivers are typically assumed to have fitness returns which depend on their ability to match an observed signal with the utility (to the receiver) of the signaller. Each signaller must decide what level to signal at, which is a function of the quality of the signaller. Additionally, signaller quality is assumed to be synonymous with the signaller's utility to a receiver. However, there is no reason to believe that signalling costs are incurred in the same currency as the receivers are paid, and thus no reason to believe that the relationship between signaller quality and utility is linear or even increasing. For instance, in signalling between prey and predators, predators may wish to increase both the chance of catching a prey item and the nutritional value of that prey item, whereas an individual prey's escape ability may go up with nutritional value. In addition, several recent studies have documented increased signalling as utility decreases. If utility and quality are decoupled, so that increasing quality does not always mean increasing utility, then traditional signalling models predict that no signalling equilibrium will exist. I show that if receiver fitness is modeled by a set of behavioral responses, which have both costs and benefits, then a signalling equilibrium can sometimes be recovered. An example of signalling between mates is presented to demonstrate this equilibrium.

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